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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIANI AIR PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GILL'S TIRE MARKET, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12992 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This action was brought by plaintiff and respon-
dent, Mariani Air Products Company, a Utah corpor-
ation, hereinafter called ''Mapco," to recover rent 
and attorney's fees due from defendant and appel-
lant, Gill's ·Tire Market, a Utah corporation, herein-
after called ''Gill's," under the terms of a written 
lease. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a non-jury trial, the Trial Court made and 
entered its written Memorandum Decision (R. 11, 
12) and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R. 16, 17) and awarded Judgmen't (R. 14, 15) in 
favor of Mapco and against Gill's in the sum of 
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$1,800.00, plus $468.33 attorney's fees and $44.50 
costs. Thereafter, Gill's filed its Notice of Appeal 
(R. 22). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On this appeal Mapco (plaintiff and respondent) 
seeks to affirm the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment made and entered by the Trial 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mapco cannot agree with the Statement of Facts 
contained in Gill's Brief because that statement is, 
for the most part, made in a light most favorable 'to 
Gill's who lost in the Trial Court, and accordingly 
'violates the time honored rule that the facts on ap-
peal must be reviewed in the light most favorable to 
the Findings and Judgment below. Accordingly, 
Mapco submits the following Statement of Facts. 
The parties entered into a written lease (Exhib-
it 1-P) dated March 16, 1970, whereby Mapco leased 
certain real property located at 648 South First West 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, to Gill's for a term of eigh-
teen (18) months, beginning March 20, 1970, for an 
agreed rental of $300.00 per month. Although Gill's 
entered into possession as agreed, its active use of the 
premises substantially declined in the fall of 1970 
(R. 53, lines 27, 28; R. 60, lines 11-17). 
Early in 1971 Gill's discovered that a por;tion of 
the interior of the building had been damaged by wa-
ter. Gill's representative, Ron Alvey, and Mapco's 
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manager, George Mohr visited the premises on Jan-
uary 28, 1971, at which time Mohr discovered that 
the water line leading to the evaporator-type air con-
ditioner on the roof was running, and Mohr turned 
it off ( R. 41, lines 25-29; R. 45, line 28 through R. 46, 
line 12). This water line should have been shut off 
and the air conditioner drained and secured for the 
winter, but Gill's had neglected to do so (R. 46, line 
17 through R. 47, line 2). 
Gill's failure to properly secure the air condi-
tioner for the winter resulted in the water freezing, 
breaking the fittings and drain and allowing the 
water to leak under the air conditioner on the roof 
( R. 4 9) . There was no leaking except under the air 
con di ti oner ( R. 4 7) . 
Although Mohr offered to repair the damages to 
the interior, Gill's refused to cooperate in arranging 
a time for the repairs to be made (R. 42,48). 
Gill's quit paying rent in March o'f 1971 and 
failed to pay the last six months rent under the lease, 
although it never did remove all of its personal prop-
erty from the premises (R. 31, line 10,11; R. 36,37, 
64). 
When Gill's failure to pay the rent came to the 
attention of Mr. Mariani, the President of Mapco, he 
tried several times to get in touch with Mr. Gill (R. 
83). He finally went to Mr. Gill's office on April 28, 
1971, at which time they jointly visited the leased 
premises. At that time Mr. Mariani asked for the 
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key so that he could have the building inspected to 
determine the cause of the damage. He told Mr. Gill 
that if it was Mapco's fault, he would fix it, but if 
it was Gill's fault, Gill would have to fix it (R. 85, 
86,87). Mr. Gill agreed to that procedure and did 
not say he was abandoning the premises and cancel-
ling the lease ( R. 86) . 
When Mr. Mariani had determined that the 
damage was caused by the broken air conditioner and 
not a leak in the roof, he made numerous attempts 
to talk to Mr. Gill, but Gill failed to return his calls 
( R. 87 -89) . After about thirty days of such avoid-
ance by Gill, Mr. Mariani told Mohr to institute legal 
action ( R. 89) . 
There is no evidence in the record to even sug-
gest that the damage to the leased premises was 
caused or contributed to by anything except the fail-
ure of Gill's to shut off, drain and secure ithe air con-
ditioner for the winter. There was no leaking after 
the air conditioner was repaired ( R. 38) . 
Written demand was made by Mapco's attorney 
on Gill's on May 26, 1971, for the delinquent rent and 
for repair of the damage (Exhibit 7-D). In response 
to that demand Mr. Gill telephoned Mapco's attorney 
and indicated a willingness to pay the rent if the dam-
age was repaired and the key returned ( R. 73, 7 4). 
On June 17, 1971, Mr. Gill's attorney wrote to Map-
co's attorney contending that the lease had been ter-
minated (Exhibit 8-D). However, even then Gill's 
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failed to remove its personal property and signs re-
maining on the premises ( R. 64) . 
Mapco commenced legal action by serving sum-
mons on June 29, 1971 (R. 4) seeking to recover the 
then delinquent rent, and additional rent as it be-
came due, and attorney's fees, and for damages to 
the premises (R. 1,2). After a non-jury trial, the 
Trial Court made and entered its written Memoran-
dum Decision (R. 11,12), Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law (R. 16-18), and awarded Judgment 
(R. 14,15) in favor of Mapco and against Gill's for 
the full amount of the unpaid rent, plus attorney's 
fees and costs. 
ARGUME'NT 
POINT I 
UNDER TRADITIONAL RULES OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE 
MUST BE AFFIRMED. 
This Court has repeatedly announced and con-
sistently followed the rule as stated in Charlton v. 
Hackett, 11Utah2d 389, 360 P. 2d 176 (1961), that 
in considering an attack on the Findings, Conclusions 
and Judgment of the Trial Court it is the duty of this 
Court: 
( 1) To indulge them the presumption of validity 
and correctness; 
(2) to require the appellant to sustain the bur-
den of showing error; 
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( 3) to review the record in the light most favor-
able to them ; and 
( 4) not to disturb them if they are substantially 
supported in the record. 
It is submitted that the Findings, Conclusions 
and Judgment of the Trial Court in favor of Mapco 
and against Gill's are substantially supported by the 
evidence and should be affirmed by this Court. 
POINT II 
MAPCO DID NOT TERMINATE THE LEASE AND 
RE'TAKE POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES, AND 
GILL'S WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN ABONDONING 
THE PREMISES. 
In the argument under Point I of its Brief, Gill's 
urges that the lease was terminated by the conduct 
of Mr. Mariani in taking the key from Mr. Gill on 
April 28, 1971. The difficulty with tha!t argument is 
that it is not supported by the facts. 
Mr. Mariani testified that he asked for the key 
so that he could make an investigation to establish the 
cause of the water damage and to determine who was 
at fault, and that Mr. Gill was agreeable to this pro-
cedure. There was no conversation about cancelling 
the lease (R. 85, 86). Mr. Mariani further testified 
1that after the investigation he attempted to contact 
Mr. Gill several times, but after Mr. Gill had avoided 
him for thirty days, he directed Mohr to take legal 
action. The written demand (Exhibit 7-D) and also 
the complaint (R. 1,2), which was filed well before 
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the expiration of the lease, both show that Mapco 
treated the lease as still in effect and sought to enforce 
its provisions. 
The Trial Court, in its written Memorandum 
Decision (R. 11) stated: 
That the plaintiff [Mapco] did nothing to in 
any way terminate the lease in question, and 
that it appears clearly to the Court from the 
evidence that it was the clear intention of the 
defendant [Gill's] to abandon the premises in 
question, and that upon the giving of the key 
to the premises to the plaintiff and the accep-
tance by the plaintiff of the key, it was not the 
plaintiff's intention by such acceptance to can-
cel and abandon the lease, and that the plain-
tiff is therefore, entitled to a judgment for the 
balance claimed by and for the leased premises. 
(emphasis added) 
In its Findings of Fact ('R. 17) the Trial Court 
found: 
4. The plaintiff, as Lessor, has not acted to ter-
minate said Lease Agreement, nor has it failed 
1to perform any obligation under said Lease 
Agreement so as to entitle the defendant Gill's 
Tire Market to terminate said Lease Agree-
ment. 
There is ample substantial admissible evidence in the 
record to support these determinations by the Trial 
Oourt, and under the rule referred to in Point I of this 
Brief, such determinations should be affirmed by this 
Court. 
The record will not support the argument that 
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Mapco actually or constructively evicted Gill's from 
the premises and thereby terminated the lease. To 
constitute an eviction there must be either a physical 
ouster or some act done by the landlord on the prem-
ises with the intent to deprive the tenant of posses-
sion. Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 NE 264, 58 
ALR 1047. 
A constructive eviction cannot be predicated up-
on a con di ti on arising from a want of repairs which 
it is the duty of the tenant to make. ( 49 Am Jur 2d 
333, Landlord and Tenant§ 315, citing Alger v. Ken-
nedy, 49Vt109). That the duty to repair was on Gill's 
rather than Mapco in this case will be argued more 
fully under Point III of this Brief. 
For a 'tenant to rely upon constructive eviction 
as a basis for avoiding payment of the rent, he must 
surrender or abandon the leased premises. Warm 
Springs Co. v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 58, 165 Pac. 
788. And the tenant is obligated to remove his person-
al property, including property of no value, trash, 
rubbish, etc. ( 49 Am J ur 2d 914, Landlord and Ten-
ant§ 940). Note that in the instant case Gill's failed 
to remove its tire racks, signs, junk tires and other 
property even as late as the tim·e of trial. 
The record just does not support Gill's argument 
that the conduct of the parties establishes a joint in-
tent to terminate the lease. The record clearly does 
support the Trial Court's Findings to the contrary. 
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POINT III 
UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE 
LEASE MAPCO WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO RE-
P AIR THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF. 
In its argument under Point II of its Brief, Gill's 
asserts that it is uncontradicted that the damage re-
sulted from a leak in the roof and that Mapco accepted 
the responsibility for repairing the roof and the dam-
age. These assertions are neither fair nor accurate. 
Although Mr. Mohr testified that on January 28, 
1971, he stated that Mapco would repair the damage, 
this was before the service company had determined 
that the freezing and breaking of the air conditioner 
had caused the damage. Mr. Mariani told Gill on 
April 28, 1971, that whoever was responsible would 
have to make the repairs. 
The applicable provisions of the lease (Exhibit 
1-P) read as follows: 
4. ***Lessor agrees to maintain the roof of the 
building located on said premises during the 
term of this lease, except for any repairs as 
may be required as a result of improvement:s 
or remodeling of said premises by Lessee or 
damage to the roof resulting from the acts and 
conduct of Lessee or others in connecti.on with 
Lessee's occupancy of the premises. Lessee 
agrees, at its expense, to maintain all of the 
remainder of said premises and the improve-
ments thereon in a satisfactory state of repair, 
including but not limited to water and sewer 
pipes, electrical wiring and fixtures, heating 
fixtures, and glass. Lessor shall not be liable 
for any damage occasioned by failure to keep 
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said premises in repair and particu"larly shall 
not be liable for any damage done or occasioned 
by or from plumbing, gas, water, steam or 
other pipes, or sewage, or the bursting, leaking 
or running of any wash stand, tank, water 
closet or waste pipe in, above, upon or about 
said building or premises, or from any leakage 
of the roof or collapse thereof.*** (emphasis 
added). 
There is substantial evidence in the record to estab-
lish that the water damage to the interior of the build-
ing was the direct and proximate result of Gill's 
failure to properly secure the air conditioner for the 
winter. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record to 
support any other conclusion. 
That Gill's has the obligation to maintain and 
secure the air conditioner is clear from the express 
language of the lease set forth above. The same obli-
gation is imposed under applicable principles of law. 
A tenant must use the premises in a reasonable man-
ner, and if, by the negligence or misfeasance of a ten-
ant the property is materially damaged, the tenant is 
liable. ( 49 Am Jur 2d 902, Landlord and Tenant § 
922) . A tenant may be liable for damages from freez-
ing due to his negligence in failing to drain plumbing 
(op. cit. § 933) . 
Since the duty to repair the damage complained 
of was on Gill's, not on Mapco, Gill's should not now 
be allowed to justify its failure to pay the rent by 
claiming that the damage rendered the premises un-
tenantable. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record is clear that as early as November of 
1970, Gill's had little or no use for the leased premises 
and sought to avoid its obligations under the lease. 
Its claimed justification for non-payment of rent is 
based on damage to the premises resulting from its 
own negligence and misconduct, and ndt from any 
failure or breach on the part of Mapco. The Trial 
Court, upon substantial evidence, so found and det.er-
mined. Under applicable rules of appellate review the 
Findings and Judgment of the Trial Court must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NATHAN J. FULLMER 
400 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaitntiff anuJ, 
Respondent 
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